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“Everything you hear about China is true.   But none of it is accurate.” 
Dr. John Frankenstein, Research Associate 
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University 
 
U.S. Firms in China:  The Hype vs. the Hard Facts 
In the late 1970s, China began to adopt economic policies that were more market 
oriented than policies it had pursued in the past, and this shift has been very successful in 
promoting economic growth.
1  Rising levels of industrial output have been accompanied 
by increases in foreign direct investment inflows, leading many to conclude that foreign 
direct investment has played an important role in China’s success.  Since China’s official 
entry to the WTO in 2001, China’s economy has continued to expand rapidly, FDI 
inflows have continued on a large scale, and China’s role in world trade has continued to 
increase.   
These developments have heightened American public interest in China.  
Numerous recent books seek to explain the Chinese economy to the general reader, and 
the popular press has expanded its coverage of Chinese economic developments.  Despite 
this growing level of information, however, significant misconceptions continue to cloud 
the popular understanding of the role of foreign firms in China, and, particularly, the role 
of U.S.-based multinationals.  Some of these misconceptions have even taken root in the 
thinking of professional economists who are outside the small community of China 
specialists. 
                                                 
1   For extensive descriptions of the history of Chinese policy with respect to FDI, please see Branstetter 
and Lardy (2006), Lardy (2002), and Naughton (1996).  For a more analytical approach which applies 
formal political economy models of policy formation to the Chinese context, see Branstetter and Feenstra 
(2002).  




In the late 1990s, when popular and professional interest in the general 
phenomenon of expanding foreign direct investment was increasing, Robert Feenstra 
wrote a useful article called “Facts and Fallacies about Foreign Direct Investment.”  The 
article corrected a number of widely misconceptions about the subject.  Inspired by his 
title as well as his approach, we seek to dispel four widely held beliefs about U.S. 
affiliate activity in China by using the most recent available data.   
 
Fallacy Number 1.  U.S. FDI in China is large. 
  The attention paid to China and its economic engagement with the rest of the 
world has led many to conclude that it is a leading destination of U.S. FDI.  Casual 
observers believe that China’s abundance of labor, high growth rates, and huge consumer 
markets attract large amounts of U.S. FDI.  This view is even held by many corporate 
executives.  A 2004 AT Kearney study found that China was perceived as the most 
favored location for FDI.  The amount of capital flowing to China from the U.S. in the 
form of FDI is thought to be sufficient to have a large effect on Chinese capital formation.  
However, data collected by Chinese statistical agencies indicate that U.S. FDI is a small 
component of total FDI in China, and data collected by U.S. agencies show that 
American firms’ investment in China is a small part of their total investment abroad.   
Statistics from the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China track 
investment by approved Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) on an annual basis.  Figure 1 
breaks down this growth in investment by the nationality of the foreign owner or partial 
owner of the FIE.
2  Prior to 1989, FDI inflows were limited and dominated by Hong 
                                                 
2   Because of official restrictions on direct Taiwanese investment in the mainland, some Taiwanese FDI 
gets routed through Hong Kong or through “tax haven” nations such as the Cayman Islands.  Such tax  




Kong and Taiwan-based investors seeking to exploit opportunities in China’s special 
economic zones.  After the international unease generated by the Tiananmen Incident 
dissipated, there was a sharp increase in FDI inflows and a pronounced diversification in 
its sources.  It was in these years that Western countries and Japan began to enter the 
Chinese market in earnest.  However, the role of American firms in these inflows has 
been and remains relatively modest.  
It is worth noting that even overall levels of FIE investment are modest.  As 
indicated in Figure 2, FIE investment in fixed assets accounts for only about 10% of total 
fixed asset investment in China. 
Just as American firms collectively account for a relatively small component of 
FDI in China, American investment in China accounts for a relatively small portion of 
total U.S. multinational activity around the world.  Table 1 shows 2004 total assets, sales, 
and employment of U.S. affiliates in China and in four regions that are the major 
destinations of U.S. FDI.  China’s share of U.S. MNE total affiliate sales and assets were 
1.9% and 0.7%, respectively, in 2004.  Although the compound annual growth rate of 
U.S. MNE sales in China over the 1982-2004 period exceeds 40%, this rapid growth has 
proceeded from a small base, and it has taken place in a context of growing multinational 
activity worldwide.
3  Chinese affiliates comprise 4.5% of U.S. total affiliate employment, 
which is a larger share than their share of assets and sales, suggesting that work 
                                                                                                                                                 
haven jurisdictions are a prominent component of the “other nations” category shown in Figure 1.  Some 
advanced countries also preferred to invest in China through Hong Kong-based subsidiaries, further 
exaggerating the apparent role played by Hong Kong.  Finally, it is widely speculated that as much as one 
quarter of the FDI originating in Hong Kong consists of Chinese entrepreneurs investing through Hong 
Kong shell companies in order to qualify as FIEs for tax and other benefits.   
3   The reported profits of U.S. affiliates in China have also grown rapidly, especially in recent years.  
Between the 1999 and 2004 benchmark surveys, net income grew nearly seven fold.  However, net income 
from Chinese affiliates only accounts for about 2% of the global net income of U.S. affiliates worldwide.  




performed in China is relatively labor intensive.
4  As the data in Table 1 suggests, most 
U.S. MNE activity takes place in other developed countries like Canada and countries in 
Europe.   
Although the data from both Chinese and U.S. sources indicate levels of foreign 
direct investment that are smaller than the popular press suggests, there are significant 
discrepancies between data from these sources.  The most comparable data sets both 
attempt to provide measures of FDI flows as opposed to measures of MNE operating 
activity.  Table 2 presents estimates of U.S. FDI outflows to China produced by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and Chinese Ministry of Commerce estimates of U.S. FDI 
inflows into China from the U.S. over the 1994-2005 period.  In each year, Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce estimates exceed the BEA estimates, often by a factor of more 
than two.   
A number of measurement issues seem to be important to explaining this 
discrepancy.  First, the Ministry of Commerce reports measures of “actually utilized 
investment” by foreign invested enterprises, and these measures include investment that 
is financed by capital flows from the foreign parent as well as investment that is financed 
through local sources, including borrowing from local banks.
5     
  Table 3 provides some indication of how important such local sources of capital 
are for foreign firms in China.  In 2004, only 70% of U.S. affiliates based in China were 
wholly owned.  Joint ventures often involve a local partner who provides equity capital as 
                                                 
4   These employment figures need to be placed in some context.  The total Chinese urban workforce in 
2005 was 273 million persons.  Foreign invested enterprises from all source countries collectively 
employed about 12.4 million persons, less than 5% of the total.  Clearly, U.S. firms’ contribution to 
employment in China is vanishingly small.   
5   We are extremely grateful to Nicholas Lardy for a series of detailed discussions which clarified our 
understanding of Chinese statistics on FDI, including the degree to which it may reflect investment 
financed by the local borrowing of FIEs.  




well as other inputs, and these types of organizational forms are more prevalent in China 
than in the other regions displayed in the table.  Slightly more than one half of the assets 
of U.S. affiliates based in China are financed with debt, and 61.4% of this debt is 
provided by local sources.  The widely documented shortcomings of Chinese financial 
markets make it surprising that Chinese lenders would figure so prominently.
6 However, 
given the hazards attending other classes of borrowers, the local subsidiaries of foreign 
multinationals can be seen as relatively creditworthy borrowers, ultimately backed by 
deep-pocketed foreign parents, and in possession of brand name and technological 
advantages over potential foreign competitors.  Loans from the parent are 18.9% of total 
debt.  While this share exceeds shares of intrafirm debt elsewhere around the world, it is 
still fairly small.
7  As a consequence of these issues, the official Chinese statistics can be 
viewed as overstating the contribution of U.S. firms to Chinese investment. 
  A second factor that might contribute to the discrepancy concerns how source 
countries are determined in FDI flow data.  In the U.S. data, any capital flow from the 
parent company to an affiliate in China through a holding company located in a third 
country is captured as a outflow from the U.S. to the third country, not from the U.S. to 
China.  The exact procedures followed by Chinese statistical authorities are not clear, and 
it is possible that data collectors use information about the ultimate nationality of foreign 
investors to classify some of the FDI routed through tax haven holding companies 
according to the nationality of the ultimate parent.   
                                                 
6   Scholarship critical of the efficiency of Chinese financial institutions includes Lardy (1998), Lardy 
(2004), Tsai (2002), and Branstetter (2007), among many other sources.   
7 Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) document that multinationals tend to make extensive use of parent 
provided capital in countries with poor financial development, and Antras, Desai, and Foley (2006) provide 
a theoretical explanation for why this would be the case, this regularity does not seem to hold for China.  




  Differences in measured FDI inflows could also be a consequence of other 
deviations between Chinese and international statistical practice.  The view that much of 
the discrepancy lies in differences in statistical practice was strengthened recently by 
massive revisions of the Chinese government’s own official estimates of the net inward 
FDI stock.  Beginning in 2005, the Ministry of Commerce released revised estimates of 
China’s net FDI stock that reduced its size by half.  Previous estimates of the stock had 
been based on accumulated inflows, and these data may not have captured reductions in 
FDI capital provided by foreigners.  The new, revised FDI stock measures are not broken 
down by source country, but the magnitude of this revision amounts to an admission that 
the previously reported figures were far too high, and suggests that the true level of FDI 
may lie closer to that indicated by U.S. data.
8  Given this, and the extent to which, even in 
the Chinese data, U.S. FDI is a relatively small component of cumulated total inflows, we 
remain quite confident in our conclusions regarding the relative size of U.S. FDI in China. 
  In order to explore why U.S. FDI in China appears to be small, we run gravity 
specifications to explain levels of U.S. MNE activity by country.
 9   In these tests, we use 
confidential data from BEA’s 2004 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 
on the operations of majority-owned nonbank affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents, which 
we aggregate to the country level.
10  We employ three different measures of U.S. MNE 
activity as dependant variables, the log of affiliate sales, the log of affiliate assets, and the 
log of affiliate employment compensation.  Our base line specification controls for 
geographic distance from the U.S. and the log of GDP (measured at market exchange 
                                                 
8  The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) issued a briefing pointing out 
this and other issues regarding Chinese FDI data and the challenges involved in comparing Chinese FDI 
statistics with those of other sources.  See UNCTAD (2007). 
9   We thank Shang-Jin Wei and Robert Feenstra for suggesting that we explore this question. 
10 For a detailed explanation of these data, see Mataloni (1995).  




rates).  It also includes a China dummy that is equal to one for China and zero for other 
countries.  If the coefficient on the China dummy is negative, this would indicate that 
measures of U.S. MNE activity in China are lower in China than a simple gravity 
specification would suggest they should be.   
Once we have estimates from this base line specification, we include other 
country characteristics that could explain the extent to which U.S. MNEs engage in 
activity in China.  Given the potential importance of taxes and corruption noted by Desai, 
Foley, Hines (2004) and Wei (2000), we include a measure of each country’s corporate 
income tax rate and the corruption index taken from the ICRG political risk data set.  In 
order to control for factors related levels of wealth and economic development more 
generally, we also include the log of GDP per capita (measured at market exchange rates).  
Descriptive statistics for the data used in the analysis presented in Table 5, as well as the 
analysis presented in Table 7, appear in Table 4. 
The results of the gravity specifications appear in Table 5.  The dependent 
variable used in columns 1-4 is the Log of Affiliate Sales, in 5-8 the Log of Affiliate 
Assets, and in 9-12 the Log of Affiliate Employment Compensation.  Our base line 
specifications appear in columns 1, 5, and 9.  In each of these specifications, the 
coefficient on the Log of Distance is negative and significant, and the coefficient on the 
Log of GDP is positive and significant.  These findings are consistent with previous work 
and indicate that U.S. MNEs engage in more activity in larger countries that are closer to 
the U.S.   In each of these specifications, the coefficient on the China dummy is negative 
and significant.  These results point out that levels of U.S. MNE activity in China are  




lower than would be predicted by a simple model in which levels of MNE activity vary 
with distance and country size.   
The specifications in columns 2, 6, and 10 include measures of corporate tax rates.  
This variable is not significant in these specifications, and its inclusion does not change 
the negative coefficient on the China Dummy very much.  Controlling for corruption, as 
in columns 3, 7, and 11, reduces the magnitude and significance of the China dummy.  
This dummy becomes insignificant although still negative in Column 3 and marginally 
significant in column 11 while the coefficient on the corruption index is positive and 
significant.  China has a corruption index of 2 on a scale of 0 to 6 where higher numbers 
imply lower levels of corruption.  These results suggest that China’s low level of US 
MNE activity is at least in part a consequence of corruption or a factor that is correlated 
with corruption.  The specifications presented in columns 4, 8, and 12 also include the 
Log of GDP per capita.  Once this variable is included, the coefficient on the China 
Dummy is no longer significant.  These results indicate that US MNE activity is actually 
not lower than one would expect if one accounts for the fact that per capita income is low 
in China and corruption is high. 
While caution is surely warranted in using regression coefficients derived from 
cross-sectional evidence to make predictions about the evolution of economic variables 
over time, it is interesting to consider what our regression coefficients imply about the 
future of U.S. FDI in China.  Given its rapid rate of current economic growth, it is likely 
that per capita income and aggregate GDP in China will rise sharply over the next 10 
years.  If the overall Chinese economy were to maintain growth rates of 10% per year  




over the next decade, the combined effects of the estimated coefficients on GDP and 
GDP per capita would predict that U.S. affiliate sales in China would more than triple.   
 
 
Fallacy Number 2.  U.S. FDI in China is Export-Oriented 
  As the U.S.-China trade deficit has grown in recent years, a number of 
commentators have suggested that it has been driven by U.S. purchases of goods 
produced by U.S. affiliates in China.  For example, in a 2000 briefing paper for the 
Economic Policy Institute, James Burke wrote, “The activities of U.S. multinational firms, 
together with China’s protectionist trade policies, have had a significant role in increasing 
the U.S. trade deficit with China.”
11   
  Foreign firms in China have indeed played an increasingly dominant role in 
China’s trade.  Figure 3 shows the role of foreign firms in Chinese imports and exports, 
respectively.  In a period in which Chinese exports and imports have been growing 
rapidly, these shares have been rising.  By 2000, the share of FIEs in Chinese exports had 
reached more than 50%, and it continued to expand.  Clearly, FIEs have accounted for a 
disproportionately large share of export growth during the years in which China has come 
to loom so large in world trade. 
  What role do U.S. affiliates play in this incredible surge of export growth?  
Almost none.  Table 6 presents statistics on the extent to which U.S. affiliates in China 
sell their goods to customers located in the U.S. and the extent to which they trade with 
the U.S.  The data illustrate that in 2004, about $39.7 billion of local affiliate sales were 
directed to the local market and only $3.7 billion were directed to the U.S. market.  In 
                                                 
11   See Burke (2000).  




that year, U.S. exports to affiliates and U.S. imports from affiliates comprised less than 
5% of affiliate sales.  These patterns are not consistent with the hypothesis that U.S. 
affiliates operating in China are contributing to the large U.S. trade deficit by producing 
there and selling back to the U.S.  Intrafirm trade by U.S. multinationals does not loom 
nearly as large in intermediating U.S.-China trade as the overall role of FIEs in Chinese 
trade might suggest.  In fact, a comparison of the total exports to and imports from China 
ascribed to U.S. multinationals seems rather small in comparison to the magnitudes of 
bilateral trade flows in 2004.  Total U.S. imports from China were $196.7 billion and 
total U.S. exports were $34.7 billion.
12  U.S. imports and exports between U.S. affiliates 
in China and their U.S. parents were $2.6 billion and $2.5 billion respectively.  
  What is true of U.S. multinationals seems to broadly true of multinationals from 
other Western countries.  Every year the Chinese Ministry of Commerce publishes a list 
of the top 200 largest mainland Chinese firms by export value.  The 200 firms included in 
the 2005 list accounted for one-third of total mainland exports in that year, providing a 
useful, if incomplete, sample of important exporting firms of all nationalities.  
Inspections of this list suggest that the total share of U.S., European, and Japanese 
multinationals in the exports of the top 200 is only 11%.
13  The majority of firms in this 
list are indeed foreign invested, but the foreigners hail from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
South Korea.  Like American firms, the leading European multinationals in China appear 
to be focused primarily on the domestic market, not exports.  The Chinese export miracle 
                                                 
12   These figures were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau web site at http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c5700.html#2004.  In 1999, U.S. exports to China totaled about $13 billion and imports from 
China were almost $82 billion. 
13   See Anderson (2006), from whom the statistics in this paragraph and the next are taken.  The language 
here closely follows his.    




largely reflects the activity of the foreign affiliates of firms based in Asia’s other newly 
industrialized countries.   
  The role played by Japanese firms in Chinese exports appears to lie somewhere in 
between the roles played by Western firms and firms headquartered in developing 
countries in Asia.  Ahn, Fukao, and Ito (2007) have used Japanese data and South Korean 
data to undertake an extensive study of the role played by these firms’ affiliates in 
regional trade flows.  Because many Japanese firms route their exports through Hong 
Kong, these authors aggregate Chinese and Hong Kong trade statistics.  They find that 
the exports of Japanese firms’ Chinese affiliates collectively account for nearly 41% of 
total Chinese/Hong Kong exports to Japan.  Likewise, about 30% of total Japanese 
exports to China go to the Chinese affiliates of Japanese firms.  The relatively greater role 
of Japanese affiliates in mediating Japan-China trade is likely to be related to geographic 
proximity and history.  China is the closest major economy to the Japanese home islands, 
and many Japanese companies were quite active in parts of China prior to the end of 
World War II.     
  The limited role played by U.S. firms in mediating U.S.-China trade is surprising 
given the extent to which large U.S. retail chains distribute Chinese goods.  According to 
some estimates, Wal-Mart accounts for almost $20 billion of Chinese exports to the U.S.  
However, Wal-Mart and other large-scale U.S. retailers typically procure their goods 
from China-based export-oriented manufacturing plants that are not U.S.-owned to any 
significant degree.
14  They tend to purchase from the same Taiwanese, Hong Kong, and 
Korean firms they sourced from a decade or two ago, expect that the final production is 
now based in mainland China.   
                                                 
14   See Anderson (2006).  




  In order to explore in more detail if U.S. affiliates based in China are more 
focused on serving the local market that one should expect, we again make use of gravity 
specifications.  In Table 7, we report results of tests that are identical to those presented 
in Table 5 except that dependant variables measure the extent to which U.S. affiliates 
based in different countries focus on serving markets outside of their host country.  These 
tests use data aggregated to the country level for the year 2004. 
  The dependent variable used in columns 1-4 is the log of affiliate sales to persons 
outside the affiliate’s host country; in 5-8 it is the share of affiliate sales to persons 
outside the host country and the U.S., and in 9-12 it is the share of affiliate sales to 
persons in the U.S.  Our baseline specifications are given in columns 1, 5, and 9, and 
these include the log of distance from the U.S., host country GDP, and a China dummy as 
controls.  The coefficient on the China dummy in column 1 is negative and marginally 
significant; it is negative and significant in column 5; but it is positive and insignificant in 
column 9.  Therefore, there is only some evidence that U.S. affiliates in China are less 
focused on serving consumers outside their host country than are U.S. affiliates elsewhere.  
In fact, the share of sales to persons in the U.S. is not lower than one would expect once 
one accounts for country size and distance from the U.S.   
Levels of sales to countries other than the host country are higher for affiliates 
located closer to the U.S. and for affiliates in larger countries.  Shares of sales to persons 
in the U.S. are higher for affiliates located closer to the U.S., but distance from the U.S. 
does not, perhaps unsurprisingly, affect the share of sales to persons in countries other 
than host countries and the U.S.  The log of GDP is also not significant in explaining 
shares of sales to the U.S. or countries other than the host country and the U.S.  




Adding corporate tax rates to our specifications reduces the coefficients on the 
China dummy.  The negative coefficients on this dummy presented in columns 2 and 6 
are both statistically significant. The negative coefficients on host country tax rates imply 
that sales to persons outside the host country are higher in low tax countries.  Tax rates 
faced by multinationals are relatively low in China.  Therefore, accounting for corporate 
tax rates would lead one to predict that affiliates based in China should be more focused 
on serving markets outside of China.  When we add the corruption index to the 
specifications, the coefficients on this variable are positive and significant in columns 3 
and 7, indicating that affiliates in countries with less corruption sell more output outside 
the host country.  Once this variable is included, none of the coefficients on the China 
dummy are significant.  The specifications presented in columns 4, 8, and 12 also include 
a control for the log of GDP per capita.  In each of these specifications, the coefficient on 
the China dummy is positive, although these coefficients are not significant.  These 
results suggest that once one accounts for levels of corruption and country wealth, as well 
as tax rates, distance, and country size, U.S. affiliates in China are not less export 
oriented that affiliates based in other countries. 
     
Fallacy Number 3.  U.S. multinational investment in China displaces investment 
elsewhere. 
  U.S. workers often express concerns about increased competition for workers 
located in countries like China.  Given the vast supply of labor in China, the low costs of 
production, and the alleged existence of technologically skilled workers, few employees 
outside of China feel secure.  In the extreme, these concerns would predict that increased  




activity in China by U.S. multinationals would displace activities that had been 
performed elsewhere.   
  The results of the previous sections suggest these concerns may be misplaced.  As 
we have already demonstrated, levels of U.S. affiliate activity in China are modest.  
Furthermore, these affiliates have been and remain overwhelmingly focused on the 
domestic market.  Given this, one would not expect increased activity in China to 
displace activity in other countries to a significant degree.  However, we can approach 
this question much more directly. Using the BEA data, it is possible to see if 
multinationals that expand employment in China cut it at home or among their other 
affiliates.  The data presented in Table 8 address this issue by providing number counts of 
incidents in which firms that increase or decrease employment in China increase or 
decrease employment in other locations.  The data include observations computed using 
firm-level data from the 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 benchmark survey results, so there 
are three periods over which increases and decreases are considered, the 1989-1994, 
1994-1999, and 1999-2004 periods.  Entries into China by existing multinationals are 
counted as increases in employment in China and exits from China are counted as 
decreases.   
  The data in the top panel reflect the growth in employment that has taken place 
among Chinese affiliates of U.S. multinationals.  It also points out that firms that expand 
in China are almost as likely to expand employment domestically as they are to cut it.  
This evidence is not what one would expect if growth in China were strictly displacing 
activity in the U.S.  The bottom panel displays similar data, but instead of considering the 
tradeoff between activity in China and activity in the U.S., it considers the tradeoff  




between activity in China and activity among other affiliates.  It appears that firms that 
are increasing employment in China are increasing, and not decreasing, it elsewhere.  
Although somewhat crude, these statistics suggest that at least extreme notions that 
would give rise to concerns of multinational employees in the U.S. and elsewhere in the 
world are unfounded. 
 
Fallacy Number 4:  U.S. multinationals are aggressively exploiting China’s growing 
technological prowess 
  In the U.S., China is often perceived as being an emerging technological 
superpower.  Industrialists, economists, and policy makers believe that China is 
becoming an attractive location to perform innovative activity.   In 2003, Intel CEO Craig 
Barrett identified China’s rising technological strength as constituting a competitive 
threat to U.S.-based high-technology industries.
15  Harvard economist Richard Freeman 
(2006) has outlined the potential consequences of the globalization of the science and 
engineering workforce for America’s historical pattern of comparative advantage in high-
technology industries.  Freeman points to the striking rise in the number of multinational 
R&D centers in China – more than 700 by the end of 2004 – and argues that this is only 
the harbinger of greater reallocation yet to come.
16  Trefler and Puga (2005) point to the 
rise of R&D activity in China and declare that the economics profession should “wake up 
and smell the ginseng!”  In its 2005 annual survey of global FDI trends, the World 
Investment Report produced by UNCTAD highlighted the internationalization of R&D, 
and singled out the growth of foreign R&D centers in China as a development of 
                                                 
15   This speech by Barrett was widely noted at the time.  See 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/10/03/technology/barrett/index.htm. 
16   See also the discussion of this trend in the 2005 World Investment Report published by UNCTAD.  




particular significance.  Management scholar Minyuan Zhao (2006) has studied the 
patents generated by these centers for clues as to how American multinationals have 
apparently learned to engage in large-scale, sophisticated R&D in a national context with 
notoriously weak intellectual property rights.   
Proponents of the view that China is quickly emerging as a favorable location for 
high tech activity often point to evidence on the growing sophistication of China’s 
exports as proof of their claims.  Schott (2006), for example, finds that over time Chinese 
exports exhibit rising sophistication relative to countries with similar aggregate 
endowments.
17  Rodrik (2006) finds an unusually high degree of technological 
sophistication in China’s export pattern.  Cui and Syed (2007) suggest that recent changes 
in China’s trade patterns indicate that it is rapidly becoming a surprisingly mature 
economy.  Preeg (2004, 9), a researcher with the Manufacturers Alliance, charges that 
China’s emergence as a major supplier of information technology, communication, and 
electronic products poses a major challenge to U.S. commercial and security interests. 
Several considerations suggest these views are overblown.  First, the extent of 
innovative activity performed in China by U.S. multinationals is surprisingly modest.  
Table 9 provides 2004 data on expenditures for research and development performed by 
U.S. affiliates in China, U.S. affiliates based in other regions, and the U.S.-based parent 
operations of U.S. MNEs.  Only $622 million was spent by U.S. MNEs on R&D in China, 
an amount that is about 3 tenths of one percent of the total R&D undertaken globally by 
U.S. MNEs.
18  Nearly 85% of R&D performed by U.S. multinationals in 2004 was 
                                                 
17   However, Schott qualifies this finding by documenting a decline in the prices of Chinese exports 
relative to OECD exports of similar products.   
18   The fraction takes as its denominator the sum of expenditures on R&D preformed by the U.S. parent 
and the R&D expenditures performed by all affiliates of U.S. firms in all countries.  




performed by the U.S.-based parent company.  Less than 13% of the $4.9 billion of the 
R&D that U.S. multinationals performed in the Asia and Pacific region was performed in 
China.   
  U.S. patent data also indicate that China’s innovative capability is more limited 
than some have suggested and that U.S. firms are not performing much innovative 
activity there.  Anyone seeking to protect intellectual property within the borders of the 
United States must apply for patent protection from the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (U.S. PTO).  Given the importance of the U.S. economy to the world in general 
and to China in particular, it is reasonable to regard patents taken out by China-based 
inventors in the U.S. as a useful indicator of inventive activity.  The CASSIS CD-ROM 
produced by the U.S. PTO provides information about U.S. patents, and we use the 
December 2006 version to produce Figure 4. 
Figure 4 tracks China-generated patents in various categories over time.  The 
dramatic growth in patenting over time is evident in this graph, but levels of patenting 
activity remain low.  From the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2006, the U.S. PTO 
granted 3,447 patents to inventors based in China or teams of inventors that included at 
least one member with a Chinese address.  Over the same period, inventors with ties to 
Japan received nearly 241,000 patents, inventors with ties to Taiwan received over 
39,000 patents, and inventors with ties to Israel received over 8,000 patents. 
   It is informative to break out patents generated in China into patents in which all 
listed inventors at the time of invention were based in China and also to break out patents 
that were assigned to U.S. corporate entities.  As Figure 4 indicates, a large and growing 
fraction of patents with Chinese inventors reflect collaborative work with inventors  





19   U.S. corporate entities appear to be associated with fewer than 
1,000 the granted patents, and only a relatively small percentage of China-generated 
patents assigned to U.S. multinationals reflect the inventive of input of a purely Chinese 
team of inventors.  This could reflect a deliberate attempt on the part of U.S. R&D 
centers in China to conduct research that only has value when combined with a 
complementary research input from the U.S. or from another relatively advanced country.  
Zhao (2006) describes this strategy as a way for U.S.-based multinationals to cope with 
the poor intellectual property rights regime in China.  Another interpretation is that 
Chinese scientists and engineers, despite impressive levels of raw talent and basic skills, 
find it difficult to innovative effectively at the technological frontier on their own, and 
often require the input of R&D managers and experts based elsewhere in the world to go 
beyond the existing state of the art.   
  While China may not yet be an important generator of U.S. patents in the 
aggregate, it is possible that China-based research activities may be important for 
particular American firms.  To assess this, we examined the total patent portfolios of U.S. 
corporate entities that hold patents in China.  As of late 2006, about 120 U.S. corporate 
assignees have been granted at least 2 patents for which at least one inventor was based in 
China.  The Chinese patents of these firms comprise only slightly more than 1% of the 
annual patenting activity of these firms in 2006.
20    
                                                 
19   Nearly 40% of China-generated U.S. patents identify inventors based in at least one other country.  In 
contrast, nearly 90% of U.S. patents granted to U.S. firms in the last three years are generated by inventors 
based solely in the U.S. and a similar percentage of Japan-generated U.S. patents represent the product of 
only Japanese inventors.   
20 One can combine the patent data with the R&D data to generate crude estimates of the patents per R&D 
dollar generated by U.S. affiliate R&D spending in China and compare that to the patents per R&D dollar 
generated by R&D spending by the parent firm in the U.S.  According to our estimates, the ratio of U.S. 
patents per R&D dollar in China is less than half this ratio in the U.S. This difference is consistent with the 
view that the R&D conducted in Chinese affiliates tends to be more focused on modification of the parent  




By far, the leading U.S. firm, in terms of China-generated patents, is Microsoft.  
Table 10 lists the top 10 corporate assignees in terms of China-generated U.S. patents.  
Microsoft has nearly three times as many China-generated patents as IBM and Intel.  
After years of fractious relationships with the Chinese government, Microsoft sought to 
cultivate more harmonious ties with key government officials by opening multiple 
research centers in the PRC.
21  Microsoft lavished rather large sums of money on these 
facilities and sought to attract high-profile researchers to them, an effort described at 
length in a recent book by Buderi and Huang, Guanxi:  The Art of Relationships.  Senior 
Microsoft executives, including former CEO Bill Gates, have regularly reiterated their 
commitment to conducting world class research in China at the very frontier of software 
technology.  In the context of that public commitment, it is interesting to note that 
Microsoft’s China-generated patents amount to less than 4% of its total cumulative 
patents to date.
22  If we restrict ourselves to patents with solely Chinese inventor teams, 
this fraction drops to about 1.5%. 
   Interestingly, the leading patent-generating firm in China, with more than four 
times Microsoft’s cumulated patent stock and a commanding lead over any indigenous 
mainland Chinese firm, is the Taiwanese contract manufacturing firm, Hon Hai, also 
known by its English trade name, Foxconn.   Hon Hai is one of four Taiwanese 
manufacturing firms to appear on this top 10 list.  As is the case with export-oriented 
                                                                                                                                                 
firm’s technology for the Chinese market or the development of technology specifically for that market 
than it is on the kind of fundamental, strategically sensitive research conducted in the parents’ own labs. 
21   An interesting account of Microsoft’s early missteps in the People’s Republic is provided by Khanna 
(1997).  Poor relationships with the central government of the PRC ensured that rates of piracy of 
Microsoft products in China remained among the highest in the world for years.   
22   In private conversations with the authors, some U.S. corporate managers have referred to the R&D 
centers opened by their firms in China as “PR&D” centers – that is, they were as much about public 
relations efforts directed at a mainland regime reluctant to enforce intellectual property rights as they were 
about “real” research and development.    




manufacturing, it appears the Taiwanese firms are more aggressively exploiting the 
opportunities to conduct research in China, such as they are, than are their U.S. 
counterparts. 
Although the amount of innovative activity performed in China is lower than it is 
often perceived to be, the types of goods China exports are fairly technologically 
advanced.  This has posed a puzzle to some economists.  However, China is able to 
export huge quantities of high tech goods only because it imports most of the high value-
added parts and components that go into these goods.
23  Figure 5 displays the level of 
Chinese exports and imports in electronic and information industry products.  The 
domestic value-added component of the value of exported electronic and information 
technology products, while growing, remains quite low.
 24  Even in the most recent years 
for which data are available, more than 70% of the value of these exports is comprised of 
imported inputs.
25   
  While U.S. multinationals, with a few exceptions, do not play a major role in 
Chinese exports of high-tech goods, we also see in U.S. affiliate data a strong correlation 
in high-tech industries between imports from the parent and sales.  Regression analyses 
of affiliate sales on measures of imported intermediates from the parent show a 
dramatically stronger connection for more R&D intensive industries, underscoring the 
relatively higher dependence of such activity in China on key inputs from the parent.  
                                                 
23   This section of the text reflects the influence of Nicholas Lardy’s writings on this subject.  Some of the 
facts and figures in the following paragraphs reproduce points made in Lardy’s presentations and in 
Branstetter and Lardy (2006). 
24   An entertaining specific example of this is provided by Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick (2007), who 
break down the production process for an Apple iPod, all of which are assembled in and exported from 
China.  The authors’ careful, if incomplete, cost accounting suggests that Chinese value added represents at 
most a few dollars of the roughly $150 factory cost for the typical iPod.   
25   In light manufacturing, in contrast, domestic content accounts for nearly 70% of the value of exports.  
See Anderson (2007) for a useful review of the most recent data.    




Taken together, levels of R&D conducted in China, the amount of patenting associated 
with innovation based in China, and the low Chinese value added in high tech Chinese 
exports suggest that China is far from becoming a technological superpower that will be 
home to a large share of U.S. MNE innovative activity. 
 
Conclusions 
  The emergence of China as an important trading economy has been one of the 
most significant economic developments of our time.  Nevertheless, the scale of U.S. 
affiliate activity in China remains relatively modest.  U.S. affiliates based in China 
account for less than 2% of total U.S. affiliate sales, they contribute relatively little to 
aggregate Chinese investment, and they play a surprisingly small role in mediating the 
expansion of U.S.-China trade.  Partly because of their strong focus on the domestic 
market and partly because of the small scale of their operations, U.S. affiliates in China 
do not appear to have significantly displaced investment elsewhere as they have increased 
the scale and scope of their operations in China.   
Limited levels of U.S. affiliate activity in China do not indicate an unusual degree 
of “China aversion” on the part of U.S. investing firms.  Rather, it reflects the fact that 
most U.S. affiliate activity takes place in countries that are large, that are geographically 
proximate to the United States, that have low levels of corruption, and that are wealthy.  
Controlling for distance, GDP, tax rates, corruption, and GDP per capita, U.S. MNE 
activity in China and the extent to which U.S. affiliates in China sell goods to the U.S. 
and other countries besides China is neither especially low, nor especially high.  Rapid 
growth in Chinese aggregate GDP and income per capita is likely to motivate U.S. firms  




to continue to expand the base of their operations in China.  But given the existing scale 
of U.S. activity elsewhere, the relative size of affiliate activity in China is likely to remain 
modest for some time to come.   
  Despite widespread interest in the possible emergence of China as a center of 
technological innovation, U.S. affiliates conduct relatively little R&D in the country, and 
affiliate activity in technology-intensive industries appears to remain quite dependent on 
the supporting activities of the parent firm.  China’s ability to innovate, as evidenced by 
numbers of U.S. patents with at least one China-based inventor, remains well behind the 
much more developed capabilities of other East Asian countries like Japan, Taiwan, and 
South Korea.  Rapid growth of R&D and invention proceeds in China, but from an 
extremely small base.  The picture traced out by rapid changes in the structure of Chinese 
exports of an emerging technological superpower belies a more modest reality.  China’s 
exports of high-technology goods are still quite dependent on imported components, 
technology, and expertise.  Despite impressive progress and spectacular growth in human 
capital, China’s transition to status as a significant net exporter of innovative goods and 
services almost certainly lies many years in the future.    
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 Source:  Data on FDI inflows are collected by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China and reported
in the China Statistical Yearbooks, various issues.





























Hong KongSource:  Data on the fraction of fixed asset investment undertaken by state-owned enterprises and 
foreign-invested enterprises are taken from the China Statistical Yearbooks, various issues.






















Foreign Invested EnterprisesSource:  Data measure the share of export value and import value accounted by foreign invested enterprises.  Data
are taken from the China Statistical Yearbooks, various issues





















import shareSource:  Data are taken from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office CASSIS CD-ROM database, December 2006 version.  China
generated U.S. patents are U.S. utility patents for which at least one listed inventor was resident in China at the time of patent
application.  Purely Chinese patents are those patents for which all listed inventors have addresses in the People's Republic of China.
Purely Chinese patents of U.S. firms are "purely Chinese" patents assigned to a U.S. corporate entity.








































Patents Purely Chinese Patents Purely Chinese Patents of U.S. FirmsSource:  Data are taken from China customs statistics and the Chinese Ministry of Information Industries (MII)






















Exports ImportsNumber of Affiliates Sales Assets Employment
China 688 71,721 63,783 455
Europe 12,367 1,909,697 5,376,372 4,291
Canada 1,839 442,607 634,677 1,092
Latin America and Other Western 
Hemisphere 3,693 417,185 1,208,716 1,936
Asia and Pacific 5,093 886,596 1,362,061 2,396
Total Affiliate Activity 23,928 3,768,733 8,757,063 10,028
These data are drawn from preliminary results of BEA’s 2004 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.  They cover all nonbank affiliates 
of nonbank U.S. parents.  Sales and assets are in millions of U.S. dollars, employment is in thousands.  
Table 1














U.S. and Chinese Estimates of FDI flows from the U.S. to China
This table presents data on aggregate annual FDI flows from the U.S. to China.  The U.S. data are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
These data are compared with the data reported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce on investment by foreign firms with U.S. parents for the same 
years;  the Chinese data are taken from various years of the China Statistical Yearbook.  Both series are reported in millions of U.S. current dollars at 
prevailing exchange rates.  Share of Affiliates 












Share of Total 
Current Liabilities 
and Long Term 
Debt Owed to 
Parents
Share of Total 
Current Liabilities 
and Long Term 
Debt Owed to 
Local Persons
Share of Total 
Current Liabilities 
and Long Term 
Debt Owed to 
Other Persons
China 70% 42,634 17,026 25,609 19% 61% 20%
Europe 89% 4,036,186 1,469,373 2,566,813 14% 46% 40%
Canada 90% 425,659 136,922 288,737 14% 74% 12%
Latin America and Other 
Western Hemisphere 81% 816,610 413,788 402,822 17% 40% 43%
Asia and Pacific 78% 746,650 227,323 519,328 12% 61% 28%
Total Affiliate Activity 85% 6,113,840 2,285,402 3,828,438 14% 49% 36%
Table 3
External finance of affiliates in 2004
These data are drawn from preliminary results of BEA’s 2004 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.  The data on the use of whole ownership covers all 
nonbank affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents, and the data on patterns in external financing only cover majority owned nonbank affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents.  Total external 
finance, total current liabilities and long term debt, and owners equity excluding retained earnings and translation adjustments are measured in millions of U.S. dollars.Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Log of Affiliate Sales 14.8417 14.7465 2.5201
Log of Affiliate Assets 15.2026 15.2270 2.7386
Log of Affiliate Employment Compensation 12.1616 12.1126 2.7121
Log of Affiliate Sales Outside Host Country 12.4630 13.4019 4.7275
Share of Sales to Countries Other Than Host Country and the US 0.2719 0.2105 0.2390
Share of Sales to the US 0.0785 0.0290 0.1250
Log of Distance 8.4632 8.4972 0.5089
Log of GDP 24.3406 23.8887 1.8934
Country Tax Rate 0.2143 0.2354 0.1319
Corruption Index 2.5636 2.4792 1.1395
Log of GDP per capita 8.0364 8.0819 1.5652
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis of 2004 affiliate activity aggregated to the country level.  Sales, assets, and 
employment compensation are measured in thousands of US dollars.  The Log of Distance is the log of distance between US and affiliate host country 
capital cities measured in miles.  The Log of GDP and the Log of GDP per Capita measure host country gross domestic product and gross domestic 
product per capita, and these variables are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.  The Country Tax Rate is a measure of the 
median effective corporate tax rate paid by US multinationals in a host country.  The Corruption Index is an index of corruption that ranges from 0 to 6, 
with lower numbers indicating higher levels of corruption, and it is taken from the ICRG political risk data.  Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Constant -5.2715 -5.3051 -5.1289 -5.2290 -6.6216 -6.4111 -6.1649 -6.3221 -8.8940 -8.8730 -8.5979 -8.7062
(2.5952) (2.6137) (2.5348) (2.5886) (2.7525) (2.7103) (2.5884) (2.6119) (2.8202) (2.8286) (2.6407) (2.7182)
China Dummy -0.7304 -0.6996 -0.3181 0.1592 -1.4867 -1.6798 -1.1471 -0.3979 -1.2344 -1.2537 -0.6584 -0.1420
(0.3040) (0.3645) (0.4006) (0.5909) (0.3132) (0.3640) (0.3537) (0.5044) (0.3161) (0.3659) (0.3706) (0.5350)
Log of Distance -0.8477 -0.8471 -0.7660 -0.7026 -0.8491 -0.8530 -0.7398 -0.6402 -1.0653 -1.0657 -0.9392 -0.8706
(0.1919) (0.1924) (0.1870) (0.1722) (0.2230) (0.2226) (0.2200) (0.1961) (0.2126) (0.2129) (0.2053) (0.1919)
Log of GDP 1.1213 1.1206 1.0558 0.9757 1.1924 1.1970 1.1066 0.9807 1.2359 1.2364 1.1353 1.0485
(0.0717) (0.0723) (0.0792) (0.0921) (0.0818) (0.0792) (0.0834) (0.0902) (0.0798) (0.0798) (0.0809) (0.0851)
Country Tax Rate 0.2148 0.2722 0.9495 -1.3462 -1.2660 -0.2028 -0.1345 -0.0449 0.6879
(1.0890) (1.0641) (1.4285) (1.2924) (1.2308) (1.4796) (1.1550) (1.0928) (1.4394)
0.2725 0.1294 0.3806 0.1560 0.4253 0.2705
(0.1118) (0.1416) (0.1351) (0.1714) (0.1025) (0.1486)
Log of GDP per Capita 0.2155 0.3382 0.2331
(0.1690) (0.1719) (0.1692)
No. of Obs. 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
R-Squared 0.7260 0.7261 0.7387 0.7445 0.6871 0.6913 0.7121 0.7243 0.7665 0.7666 0.7931 0.7990
Table 5
Levels of Affiliate Activity
Log of Affiliate Sales Log of Affiliate Assets Log of Affiliate Employment Compensation
Corruption Index
This table presents results of specifications explaining measures of 2004 affiliate activity aggregated to the country level.  The dependant variable in the specifications presented in columns (1)-(4) is the log of affiliate 
sales, and it is the log of affiliate assets and the log of affiliate employment compensation in the specifications (5)-(8) and (9)-(12).  Sales, assets, and employment compensation are measured in thousands of US dollars.  
The China Dummy is equal to one for China and zero for other countries.  The Log of Distance is the log of distance between US and affiliate host country capital cities measured in miles.  The Log of GDP and the Log 
of GDP per Capita measure host country gross domestic product and gross domestic product per capita, and these variables are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.  The Country Tax Rate is a 
measure of the median effective corporate tax rate paid by US multinationals in a host country.  The Corruption Index is an index of corruption that ranges from 0 to 6, with lower numbers indicating higher levels of 
corruption, and it is taken from the ICRG political risk data.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses.1989 1994 1999 2004
U.S. Multinational Affiliate Sales
Sales to the U.S. 1 219 2,703 3,694
Local Sales 242 2,520 14,306 39,719
Sales to other foreign countries 13 486 3,371 11,293
U.S. Exports of goods to affiliates
Total 39 371 3,103 2,974
Shipped by U.S. Parents 35 288 2,529 2,541
Shipped by unaffiliated U.S. persons 4 83 574 433
U.S. Imports of goods shipped by affiliates
Total 1 448 2,640 3,188
Shipped to U.S. Parents 1 403 1,778 2,640
Shipped to unaffiliated U.S. persons NA 45 862 548
Affiliate sales by destination and trade activity
Table 6
These data are drawn from published results of BEA’s benchmark surveys of U.S. direct investment abroad for 1989, 1994, 1999, and 
2004.  The data only cover majority owned nonbank Chinese affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents.  Sales, exports and imports are measured 
in millions of U.S. dollarsDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Constant -13.6344 -12.9538 -12.5654 -12.8197 -0.0849 -0.0289 0.0008 -0.0267 0.6123 0.6360 0.6305 0.6289
(7.6975) (7.1763) (6.9449) (6.9341) (0.3983) (0.3913) (0.3800) (0.3683) (0.3165) (0.3100) (0.3128) (0.3137)
China Dummy -1.2602 -1.8846 -1.0439 0.1684 -0.0826 -0.1340 -0.0698 0.0611 0.0304 0.0087 -0.0030 0.0046
(0.7222) (0.9812) (1.0882) (1.3090) (0.0419) (0.0515) (0.0619) (0.0885) (0.0299) (0.0262) (0.0300) (0.0457)
Log of Distance -1.3042 -1.3168 -1.1381 -0.9769 0.0567 0.0557 0.0693 0.0867 -0.0485 -0.0490 -0.0515 -0.0505
(0.6683) (0.6549) (0.6483) (0.6390) (0.0338) (0.0346) (0.0326) (0.0320) (0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0215)
Log of GDP 1.5261 1.5410 1.3983 1.1947 -0.0050 -0.0038 -0.0147 -0.0367 -0.0051 -0.0045 -0.0025 -0.0038
(0.2061) (0.2017) (0.2124) (0.2380) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0121) (0.0172) (0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0080) (0.0096)
Country Tax Rate -4.3521 -4.2255 -2.5052 -0.3585 -0.3489 -0.1631 -0.1511 -0.1529 -0.1421
(3.2355) (3.2056) (3.3893) (0.1911) (0.1871) (0.1986) (0.1114) (0.1113) (0.1302)
0.6006 0.2372 0.0459 0.0067 -0.0084 -0.0107
(0.2663) (0.4416) (0.0229) (0.0253) (0.0076) (0.0140)
Log of GDP per Capita 0.5473 0.0591 0.0034
(0.4405) (0.0269) (0.0156)
No. of Obs. 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
R-Squared 0.3852 0.3997 0.4172 0.4278 0.0169 0.0557 0.0954 0.1441 0.0448 0.0699 0.0748 0.0754
Corruption Index
Table 7
Affiliates Sales by Location
Share of Sales to Countries Other Than Host 
Country and the US
Share of Sales to the US
This table presents results of specifications explaining measures of 2004 affiliate sales aggregated to the country level.  The dependant variable in the specifications presented in columns (1)-(4) is the log of affiliate 
sales outside of the host country, and it is the share of affiliate sales to countries other than the host country and the US and the share of affiliate sales to the US in the specifications (5)-(8) and (9)-(12).  Sales are 
measured in thousands of US dollars.  The China Dummy is equal to one for China and zero for other countries.  The Log of Distance is the log of the distance between US and affiliate host country capital cities 
measured in miles.  The Log of GDP and the Log of GDP per Capita measure host country gross domestic product and gross domestic product per capita, and these variables are drawn from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators.  The Country Tax Rate is a measure of the median effective corporate tax rate paid by US multinationals in a host country.  The Corruption Index is an index of corruption that ranges from 0 to 
6, with lower numbers indicating higher levels of corruption, and it is taken from the ICRG political risk data.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses.







Change in employment in 
China
Change in employment among other 
affiliates
This table present number counts of the incidents in which changes in a firm's employment in China are 
associated with changes in the firms employment in the U.S. and among its other affiliates.  Changes 
are measured over three distinct time periods, 1989-1994, 1994-1999, and 1999-2004.
Change in employment in 
China
Change in domestic employment





Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere 882
Asia and Pacific 4,934
Total Affiliate Activity 27,529
Parent Activity 152,384
U.S. MNE Research and Development
Table 9
These data are drawn from the published results of the 2004 BEA Survey of U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad.  The affiliate data only cover majority owned nonbank affiliates of nonbank 
parents, and the parent activity measure covers all nonbank parents of nonbank affiliates.  
Research and development expenditures are measured in millions of U.S. dollars. 
Table 10 
 
Top 10 Chinese Generators of U.S. Patents 
 
Rank Name  Nationality  Numbers  of  U.S. 
Patents 
1 Hon  Hai/Foxconn*  Taiwan  644 




4 China  Petrochemical China  79 
5 SAE  Magnetics*** Japan  39 
5  China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corp 
China 39 
6 Huawei  Technologies China  34 
7 IBM  U.S.  33 
7 Winbond  Electronics  Taiwan  33 




10 Proctor  and  Gamble  U.S.  24 
*Hon Hai Precision Industries in Taiwan takes out patents in the U.S. under its 
Taiwanese name and its English trade name.  Figures here represent the sum of China-
generated patents taken out under both names.   
**Inventec Corporation has multiple subsidiaries and affiliates that take out patents in the 
U.S.; the figures reported here represent the sum of these patents.   
***SAE Magnetics, based in Hong Kong, is a wholly owned subsidiary of TDK, a 
Japanese multinational electronics manufacturer.   
 
 